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Abstract: This paper attempts to analytically examine the 
possibility of constitutional borrowing for the Muslim 
world regardless the differences in history, system, culture, 
language, and characteristics. It discusses this issue by 
looking at the arguments put forth by the opponents of 
comparative constitutional interpretation and their counter 
arguments. It will consider materials from Canada, USA, 
South Africa, Singapore, Malaysia, and Hungary, taking the 
position that constitutional borrowing can be justified. The 
paper argues that the 1999-2002 Indonesian constitutional 
reform should be taken into account by other Muslim 
countries in undertaking their constitutional reform. The 
substantive approach of the Shari>‘ah that has been used in 
Indonesia has shown that Muslim world can reform its 
constitutions without the “assistance” of Western foreign 
policy. Indonesian constitutional reform has demonstrated 
that Islamic constitutionalism comes from within Islamic 
teaching and the Islamic community itself; it is a home 
grown product. 
Keywords: Constitutional reform, constitutional borrowing 
comparative law, Shari>‘ah. 
Introduction 
Comparative constitutional law is “part of a larger phenomenon: 
the globalization of the practice of modern constitutionalism.”1 The 
trend of this discipline is to learn from constitutional experience 
                                                 
1See Sujit Choudhry, ‘Globalization in Search of Justification: Toward a Theory of Comparative 
Constitutional Interpretation,’ 74 Ind. L.J. 819 (1999). 
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elsewhere. Several countries such as South Africa and Canada go 
further. Not only do they learn from others but also interpret their 
own constitutions by analysing other constitutions.2 In other words, 
comparing constitutional experiences elsewhere might contribute to 
the interpretation of their own constitutions. 
Other countries however, such as Singapore and Malaysia, suggest 
that a constitution must be interpreted “within its own four walls.” In 
the words of Justice Scalia (United States of America), “We think such 
comparative analysis inappropriate to the task of interpreting a 
constitution, though it was of course quite relevant to the task of 
writing one.”3 It seems to this group that learning from others does 
not mean that one may borrow others’ constitutional interpretations to 
understand one’s own constitution.4 The question is: can constitutional 
borrowing be justified while every country has its own history, system, 
culture, language, and characteristics? 
Firstly, this paper would discuss this issue by looking at the 
arguments put forth by opponents of comparative constitutional 
interpretation and their counter arguments. It will consider materials 
from Canada, USA, South Africa, Singapore, Malaysia, and Hungary, 
taking the position that constitutional borrowing can be justified. The 
main argument might be summarised in the following quotation, “I 
never completely understood the French law before coming to the 
United States and studying another system (Pierre Lepaulle).”5 
Secondly, the theoretical debate above will be applied in the 
context of the Muslim world. Whilst constitutionalism in the West is 
mostly identified with secular thought,6 Islamic constitutionalism has 
attracted growing interest in recent years. For instance, the Bush 
Administration’s response to the events of 11 September 2001 radically 
transformed the situation in Iraq and Afghanistan. Both countries are 
                                                 
2 See Section 39 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa; and USA v. 
Burns 195 D.L.R (4th) 1 S.C.C. (2001) (excerpts). 
3 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 n.11 (1997) at 935, footnote 11. 
4 See Vernon Valentine Palmer, ‘Insularity and Leadership in American Comparative 
Law: The Past One Hundred Years,’ 75 Tul. L. Rev. 1093 (2001). 
5 As quoted by Kai Schadbach, ‘The Benefits of Comparative Law: A Continental 
European View,’ 16 B.U. Int'l L.J. 331 (1998). 
6 Graham Hassal and Cheryl Saunders, Asia-Pacific Constitutional Systems (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 42. See also C Perry Patterson, ‘The Evolution 
of Constitutionalism’ (1948) 32 Minnesota Law Review pp. 427-457. 
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rewriting their constitutions.7 As Ann Elizabeth Mayer points out, 
Islamic constitutionalism is “constitutionalism which is in some form 
based on Islamic principles”.8  
Behind all this lies a basic question: can a state be at once truly 
democratic and in some sense Islamic in character? In other Muslim 
countries, the alternative to trying democracy has been autocracy, 
whether secular dictatorship or religious monarchy. Indonesia before 
1998 era shared similar experiences. It is worth considering that the 
original 1945 Constitution was an inappropriate foundation on which 
to erect the superstructure of a democracy. Since its re-instatement by 
President Soekarno, on 5 July 1959, the 1945 Constitution has 
facilitated the establishment of two authoritarian regimes, “Guided 
Democracy,” under Soekarno and the “New Order,” under President 
Soeharto, which together lasted for almost four decades.9  
In addition, for more than half a century Indonesia has been 
unable to conduct an un-interrupted dialogue, concerning the position 
of Shari>‘ah in the Constitution. In 1945 and 1955, efforts were 
hampered by the pressure of time and political maneuverings by 
Soekarno and the military. Under Soeharto, debate was forbidden, 
since his government was afraid of its disruptive potential. The 
moment for free dialogue and debate, through constitutional 
                                                 
7 For a full account, see International Crisis Group (ICG), ‘Iraq’s Constitutional 
Challenge’, (Baghdad and Brussels, ICG Middle East Report No. 19, 13 November 
2003); International Crisis Group (ICG), ‘Afghan’s Flawed Constitutional Process’, 
(Kabul and Brussels, ICG Asia Report No. 56, 12 June 2003). 
8 See Ann Elizabeth Mayer, ‘Conundrums in Constitutionalism: Islamic Monarchies in 
an Era of Transition’ 1 UCLA Journal of Islamic and Near Eastern Law, 2002, 183. 
9 On Indonesian constitutional reform see Todung Mulya Lubis, ‘Constitutional 
Reforms’ in Hadi Susatro (et.al.), Governance in Indonesia: Challenges Facing the Megawati 
Presidency (Singapore: ISEAS, 2003). See also Harun Alrasid, Naskah UUD 1945 Sesudah 
Tiga Kali Diubah oleh MPR (Jakarta: UI Press, 2002); Didit Hariadi Estiko (ed.), 
Amandemen UUD 1945 dan Implikasinya terhadap Pembangunan Sistem Hukum Nasional 
(Jakarta: Tim Hukum Pusat Pengkajian dan Pelayanan Informasi Sekretariat Jenderal 
DPR-RI, 2001); Suwarno Adiwijoyo, Amandemen UUD 1945 (Jakarta: Intermasa, 2000); 
The Habibie Centre, Naskah Akademis dan Draf Rancangan Naskah Undang-Undang Dasar 
Republik Indonesia (Jakarta: The Habibie Centre, 2001); Anhar Gonggong, Amandemen 
Konstitusi, Otonomi Daerah dan Federalisme: Solusi untuk Masa Depan (Yogyakarta: Media 
Presindo, 2001); Hendarmin Ramadireksa, Visi Politik Amandemen UUD 1945 Menuju 
Konstitusi yang Berkedaulatan Rakyat (Jakarta: Yayasan Pancur Siwah, 2002); Jimly 
Asshiddiqie, ‘Telaah Akademis atas Perubahan UUD 1945’ (2001) 1 (4) Jurnal 
Demokrasi & HAM, 17. 
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mechanisms, came after Soeharto’s resignation on May 1998. The 
challenge, as the transition to democracy began in 1998, was what to 
do about the Constitution.  
In this sense, the paper would argue that the 1999-2002 
Indonesian constitutional reform should be taken into account by 
other Muslim countries. Under this approach, the flexibility of Islamic 
law is secured, and citizen’s constitutional rights are guaranteed. 
The substantive approach of the Shari >‘ah that has been used in 
Indonesia has shown that Muslim world can, and should, reform its 
constitutions without “assistance” or “direction” from Western or U.S. 
foreign policy. Indonesian constitutional reform has demonstrated that 
Islamic constitutionalism comes from within Islamic teaching and the 
Islamic community itself; it is a home grown product. In the Muslim 
world, this model is important since the Indonesian experience has 
demonstrated that the Shari>‘ah does provide a basis for constitu-
tionalism. This suggests that it is possible to reconcile between Islam 
and democratic constitutionalism. 
Arguments Put Forth by Opponents  
There are, at least, four strong arguments not to use comparative 
constitutional interpretation. Firstly, the term “comparative law” does 
not explain adequately what the comparative method is or should be. 
There are some basic questions here: Is the comparative method 
anything more than mere comparison? What purposes are served by 
legal comparisons? What exactly is chosen for comparison, and from 
which perspective? With which techniques are comparisons of specific 
variables differentiated? Why choose a particular variable or standard 
of differentiation? How might comparisons be evaluated and on what 
basis or rationale? How do these questions and the responses they 
generate relate to one another, and will these inquiries yield satisfactory 
answers? These questions lead to the suspicion that comparative 
jurisprudence opens the door to the problems of conceptual and 
cultural relativism —which cannot easily be resolved. 
Secondly, in Printz v. United States, the US Court held that Congress 
lacked the power to require state law-enforcement officials to conduct 
background checks on prospective firearms purchasers. Such a 
requirement, the Court held, was inconsistent with the principles of 
dual sovereignty embodied in the US constitutional system. Justice 
Breyer, dissenting, argued that experience in other federal systems 
demonstrated that the Court’s notion of sovereignty was not an 
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essential part of federalism, and suggested that the Court should weigh 
and consider the experience of the European Union. According to 
Justice Breyer, when interpreting the Constitution, judges could 
appropriately draw on constitutional experiences elsewhere, which 
could serve to ‘cast an empirical light on the consequences of different 
solutions to a common legal problem.’10  
This was summarily dismissed by Justice Scalia’s majority opinion, 
as has been noted earlier, that experience in other systems might 
properly bear on designing a constitution, but not on interpreting the 
one already in place. Justice Scalia’s statement, ‘The fact is that our 
federalism is not Europe’s,’11 suggests that the law of a particular 
country is deeply rooted in that country’s history and traditions. That 
law gives voice to aspirations, fears, and priorities specific to that 
country’s culture. Although the rhetoric and terminology used by 
different jurisdictions may sound and even feel similar, the same words 
and phrases can, and often do, convey different meanings.12 
Thirdly, a ‘four walls’ approach focuses judicial attention on the 
constitutional context and local culture (assuming this is static and 
identifiable). In Singapore, the High Court in Colin Chan v PP 13 
affirmed the approach adopted by Thomson CJ in the Malaysian case 
of Government of the State of Kelantan v Government of the Federation of 
Malaya, ‘the Constitution is primarily to be interpreted within its own 
four walls and not in the light of analogies drawn from other countries 
such as Great Britain, the United States of America or Australia.’14 
In Colin Chan v PP, How QC pointed to the international 
dimension in the balancing of rights and competing interests. The 
added importance of a particular right was the fact that it was also a 
universally accepted human right and hence this ought to be factored 
into the balancing process. He pointed out that religious liberty was 
enshrined in Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
                                                 
10 Printz v. United States, at 970-971. 
11 Ibid. 
12 See Christopher Osakwe, ‘Rethinking the Communion Between the Common Laws 
of England and the United States,’ 82 Nw. U. L. Rev. 855 (1988) (reviewing P.S. Atiyah 
& R.S. Summers, Form and Substance in Anglo-American Law: A Comparative Study 
in Legal Reasoning, Legal Theory and Legal Institutions (1987). 
13 Chan Hiang Leng Colin v. P.P., 3 S.L.R. 662 (1994). 
14 State of Kelantan v. Government of the Federation of Malaysia, M.L.J., 355 (1963).  
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Yong CJ brushed aside this consideration by declaring: ‘I think the 
issues here are best resolved by a consideration of the provisions of 
the Constitution, the Societies Act and the UPA alone.’15 
Fourthly, there is a danger of borrowing from other constitutional 
experiences. The quotation below provides a good example on this 
matter: 
....the Hungarian Constitutional Court —by adopting the 
German view without critical analysis and without 
investigating the whole legal and socio-economic 
environment in which the German decisions were made— 
protected many parts of the status quo inherited from the 
communist period without taking into consideration the 
completely distinct legal nature of the right to property and 
to social rights.  
The qualification of social claims by the Hungarian 
Constitutional Court, mechanically following the German 
view, might have resulted in an unreformable social system. 
The Hungarian Constitutional Court’s practice was revised 
after some months and the constitutionality of social claims 
legislation was later qualified as belonging under the 
framework of the Constitution’s social rights provisions.16 
All arguments discussed above lead to the rejection of comparative 
constitutional interpretation. It is time to move to the next section. 
The paper will raise five counter-arguments concerning the 
comparative constitutional law, and at the same time, provide evidence 
that constitutional borrowing can be justified. 
Counter Argument 
The paper argues that there are, at least, five strong arguments to 
justify constitutional borrowing. Firstly, although there is a debate as to 
whether comparative law is a method, a discipline or a science,17 it can 
be stated that several scholars have asserted that comparative law has 
method of comparison. Schlesinger, Baade, Herzog, and Wise dedicate 
                                                 
15 Chan Hiang Leng Colin v. P.P., op. cit. 
16 More information can be obtained from Imre Vörös, ‘Contextuality and 
Universality: Constitutional Borrowings on the Global Stage - The Hungarian View,’ 
University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law, Vol 1, No. 3, (Spring 1999). 
17See, for instance, Francois Venter, Constitutional Comparaison: Japan, Germany, Canada, 
and South Africa as Constitutional States (Cape Town: Juta & Co., 2000), pp. 15-19. 
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the introduction of their popular casebook to the topic of comparative 
methods.18 These authors define comparative law as a ‘method, a way 
of looking at legal problems, legal institutions, and entire legal systems, 
...... [which can be used for] a wide variety of practical or scholarly 
purposes.’19 Most of this discussion attempts to illustrate, through 
cases and extensive notes, the many uses of comparative methods. It 
explains that valuable use of comparisons may be made in the 
application of a foreign solution as a model in a rule or decision, or a 
piece of legislation, to demonstrate perspective by way of a contrast in 
the resolution of cross-border disputes through unification or 
harmonization, or in legal science; including empirical social science 
and jurisprudence. 
In addition, Zweigert and Kötz state some basic points about legal 
comparisons. For example, they claim that because explanations of 
legal systems are often stated in terms internally unique to each system, 
one must ‘free’ these explanations ‘from the context of [each] 
system.’20 Arguably, they support creating an abstract heuristic 
conceptual framework within which contrasts of chosen variables can 
be understood. As a second step, Zweigert and Kötz stress that 
function is ‘the start-point and basis of all comparative law...[because] 
different legal systems can be compared only if they solve the same 
factual problem.’21 It would be misleading to compare only parts of a 
                                                 
18 See Rudolf B. Schlesinger (et.al), Comparative Law: cases, text, materials, 6th edition 
(Mineola, N.Y.: Foundation Press, 1998), pp. 1-43. 
19 Ibid, p. 2.  
20 See K. Zweigert & H. Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law, 3rd edition, 1998, p. 
36.  
21 Ibid. As a comparison, Watson argues that ‘political, moral, social and economic 
values which exist between any two societies make it hard to believe that many legal 
problems are the same for both except on a technical level. He draws a bright line 
between a comparison of these factors and more technical legal comparisons when he 
writes: ‘when the starting point is the problem the weight of investigation will always 
be primarily on the comparability of the problem, only secondarily on the 
comparability of the law; and any discipline founded on such a starting point will be 
sociology rather than law.’ See. Alan Watson, Legal Transplant: an approach to comparative 
law, 2nd edition, (Athens, Ga., 1993), pp. 4-5. Pierre Legrand criticises this book in, 
‘The Impossibility of “Legal Transplants,” 4 Maastricht Journal of European and 
Comparative Law, 1997]. However, it should be noted that Watson describes the 
absence of discussion on the topic of what the comparative method is: ‘What is this 
method or technique? The student will find that the question tends to remain 
unanswered.’ In contrast, I believe that the answer is still there but there is no single 
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solution. Instead, one must ‘build a system...[with a] special syntax and 
vocabulary.’22 Here Zweigert and Kötz recognize the importance of 
shifting back and forth between micro and macro analysis. As a third 
step, a comparative system must be flexible enough to grasp a wide 
variety of ‘heterogeneous institutions which are functionally 
comparable.23 Finally, the comparison ought to produce an evaluation; 
otherwise comparative legal studies amount to little more than ‘piling 
up blocks of stone that no one will build with.’ 24 
This paper would acknowledge that the issue of method discussed 
here is a complex issue and there would be no single answer, even in 
principle, to the basic questions, ‘what is law?’; 25 ‘what is comparative 
law’;26 and ‘what is the limit of constitutional interpretation?’.27 
However, this does not mean that there is no method of comparative 
law. 
Secondly, the paper takes the view that what comparative law 
should aim for is an understanding of conscious ideas at work in the 
foreign legal system; that is, the principles, concepts, beliefs, and 
reasoning that underlie the foreign legal rules and institutions. It might 
be true that one should study rules, and ideas, and philosophy, and 
economics, and sociology—in short, that one should study everything, 
to understand other constitutions. However, in terms of comparative 
jurisprudence, in contrast, one would seek to understand ideas: as it is 
indeed interested in economic and social relations, but only to the 
extent that they play a role in the thought of jurists. Unlike others who 
portray an immediate relationship between the background economic 
structure and the functioning of the legal system, comparative 
                                                                                                      
answer or method and no set of criteria which would be useful for all purposes, or 
acceptable to all scholars. 
22 Zweigert & Kötz, Loc. Cit. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid, p. 41.  
25 Zweigert & Kötz wrote, ‘According to Gustav Radbruch, ‘sciences which have to 
busy themselves with their own methodology are ‘sick sciences’. In the next paragraph, 
they wrote, ‘If there is a ‘sick science’ in Radbruch’s sense today it is not comparative 
law but rather legal science as a whole.’ (Ibid, p. 33).  
26 See. John C. Reitz, ‘How to Do Comparative Law,’ 46 Am. J. Comp. L. 617 (1998) . 
27 See. for instance, David M. Beatty, ‘The Forms and Limits of Constitutional 
Interpretation,’ 49 Am. J. Comp. L. 79 (2001); and also Michael C. Dorf and Barry 
Friedman , ‘Shared Constitutional Interpretation,’ 2000 Sup. Ct. Rev. 61 (2000).  
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jurisprudence sees the relationship as crucially mediated through the 
realm of jurisprudential thought.28 
This means that the unique characteristic of foreign countries is 
recognized, but it does not mean that constitutional borrowing cannot 
be justified. In fact, legal transplantation has been practiced widely. For 
example, the American Bar Association’s Central and East European 
Law Initiative (CEELI) has, with the support of the Federal 
government, dispatched scholars, practitioners, and judges into former 
Soviet countries to review constitutional drafts and help formulate 
laws, especially in the economic sphere. A vast array of scholarly 
writings and statutory models pertaining to the organization of the 
legal profession, legal education, and commercial, environmental, and 
criminal law has been proffered to post-Communist legislators, judges, 
lawyers, and legal educators.  
In addition, under the auspices of the State Department, the 
American Bar Association, the Ford Foundation, and others, 
delegations of American judges and lawyers have visited Eastern 
Europe and Asia to explain how America’s independent judiciary 
protects citizens’ basic legal rights against state action, and, in 
Cambodia, American lawyers and judges have teamed up with their 
counterparts from Australia and India to help Cambodian lawyers and 
judges develop a legal system.29  
While other countries are willing to gain benefit from American 
experience, American lawyers and judges seem to pay little or no 
attention to the law of other countries when focusing on the domestic 
issues they litigate and adjudicate at home. It is interesting to mention 
Judge Guido Calabresi’s opinion when he looked to the constitutional 
courts of Germany and Italy in discussing what courts should do when 
a law, rational when enacted, becomes increasingly dubious over time. 
He wrote: 
                                                 
28 This argument is based on William Ewald, ‘The Jurisprudential Approach to 
Comparative Law: A Field Guide to ‘Rats’, 46 Am. J. Comp. L. 701 (1998) and, also by 
the same author, ‘Comparative Jurisprudence (1): What Was It Like to Try a Rat?,’ 143 
Penn. L. Rev. 1889 (1995) and, again, William Ewald, ‘Comparative Jurisprudence (II): 
The Logic of Legal TranspIants,’ 43 Am. J. Comp. L. 489 (1995). 
29 Shirley S. Abrahamson and Michael J. Fischer, ‘All the World’s a Courtroom: 
Judging in the new millennium,’ 26 Hofstra L. Rev. 273 (1997); See also Bruce 
Ackerman, ‘The Rise of World Constitutionalism,’ 83 Va. L. Rev. 771 (1997). 
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At one time, America had a virtual monopoly on 
constitutional judicial review....drawing origin and inspi-
ration from American constitutional theory and prac-
tice....These countries are our "constitutional offspring" 
and how they have dealt with problems analogous to ours 
can be very useful to us when we face difficult consti-
tutional issues. Wise parents do not hesitate to learn from 
their children.30 
However, the danger of looking at others without understanding 
still remains. In other words, many wise parents cannot understand 
their children well, even though they do not hesitate to learn from 
them. The quotation below explains this matter: 
I may misrepresent the legal traditions from which these 
cases come or fail to discern nuances in the opinions…but 
the risks inherent in exploring different legal systems are 
risks that American lawyers and state court judges take 
every day. We are already comparatists. We just don’t think 
of ourselves that way…The American federal system has 
made seasoned comparatists of all of us. Every American 
law school class and casebook uses the comparative law 
method, drawing upon examples and opinions from 
numerous states and state courts. Every American lawyer 
and judge must pay attention to the law developing in other 
state jurisdictions….Why shouldn’t our experiences as 
American comparatists embolden more American lawyers 
and judges to explore the law of non-American 
jurisdictions in the same spirit? Why shouldn’t we take 
advantage of the comparatist instincts learned in our law 
schools and practiced in our courts by venturing farther a 
field? … Indeed, we can cross the divide separating us 
from other jurisdictions around the world. And if we do so 
with the modest intent to borrow ideas on classifying, 
discussing, and solving a particular problem, we should not 
be deterred by unfamiliarity with foreign legal systems.31 
The quotation concludes that, ‘We may fail to understand a 
particular system of law or even misinterpret some foreign decisions. 
Nevertheless, we may also find unexpected answers or new challenges 
                                                 
30 United States v. Then, 56 F.3d 464, 469 (2d Cir. 1995) (Calabresi, J., concurring).  
31 Shirley S. Abrahamson and Michael J. Fischer, op. cit., p. 286. 
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to domestic legal issues.’32 This is the third argument for justifying 
constitutional borrowing: that one has not only the danger of 
comparative constitutional interpretation, but also the benefit and the 
advantages of using it. 
Therefore, the next issue is that: if the danger of misinterpreting 
foreign constitutions still exists, then, is there any approach which can 
be used to minimise the danger in order to obtain more benefits and 
advantages? The answer is “yes”, and this becomes my fourth 
argument. 
Mark Tushnet33 has tried to provide a more systematic approach to 
the possibility of learning from constitutional experience elsewhere. He 
offers three approaches: functionalism, expressivism, and bricolage. 
Functionalism claims that particular constitutional provisions create 
arrangements which serve particular functions in a system of 
governance. Comparative constitutional study can help identify those 
functions and show how different constitutional provisions serve the 
same function in different constitutional systems. According to the 
expressivist view, constitutions help constitute the nation, to varying 
degrees in different nations, offering to each nation’s people a way of 
understanding themselves as political beings.  
Contemporary reference to comparative constitutional materials 
may be a form of bricolage. Functionalists and expressivists worry 
about whether appropriating selected portions of other constitutional 
traditions is sensible, or whether the appropriation will ‘work’ in some 
sense. The bricoleur does not have these concerns about maintaining 
proper borders among systems. Tushnet explains more: 
Comparative constitutional analysis can use the idea of 
bricolage in several ways. In contrast to functionalism and 
expressivism, which offer ways of interpreting particular 
constitutional provisions, bricolage cautions against 
adopting interpretive strategies that impute a high degree of 
constructive rationality to a constitution’s drafters. Further, 
the idea of bricolage can displace our sense of the taken-
for-granted in the constitutional system with which we are 
                                                 
32 Ibid; See also Kathryn A. Perales, ‘Note, It Works Fine in Europe, So Why Not 
Here?: Comparative Law and Constitutional Federalism, 23 Vt. L. Rev. 885, 897-905 
(1999).  
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most familiar, without suggesting, as the functionalist 
would, that we can replace some parts of what we take for 
granted with elements appropriated from other systems. 
Finally, bricolage brings the historical contingency of all 
human action to the fore. It may therefore help us think 
about the recent interest in comparative constitutional law 
in the Supreme Court and the legal academy. 34 
Meanwhile, Sujit Choudhry claims that comparative jurisprudence 
is used in three different approaches in constitutional adjudication. He 
explains in his own words:35 
The first interpretive mode, universalist interpretation, 
holds that constitutional guarantees are cut from a universal 
cloth, and, hence, that all constitutional courts are engaged 
in the identification, interpretation, and application of the 
same set of norms. Those norms are comprehended as 
transcendent legal principles that are logically prior to 
positive rules of law and legal doctrines. 
The second mode, genealogical interpretation, holds that 
constitutions are often tied together by complicated 
relationships of descent and history, and that those 
relationships are sufficient justification to import and apply 
entire areas of constitutional doctrine. In stark contrast to 
universalist interpretation, genealogical argument is 
positivist in structure, because genealogical relationships 
confer sufficient authority and validity on comparative 
sources to make them legally binding. 
In the third mode, dialogical interpretation, courts identify 
the normative and factual assumptions underlying their 
own constitutional jurisprudence by engaging with 
comparable jurisprudence of other jurisdictions. Through a 
process of interpretive self-reflection, courts may conclude 
that domestic and foreign assumptions are sufficiently 
similar to one another to warrant the use of comparative 
law. Conversely, courts may conclude that comparative 
jurisprudence has emerged from a fundamentally different 
constitutional order; this realization may sharpen an 
awareness of constitutional difference or distinctiveness.  
                                                 
34 Ibid., p. 1229; see also Mark Tushnet, ‘Returning with Interest: Observations on 
Some Putative Benefits of Studying Comparative Constitutional Law,’ 1 U. Pa. J. Const. 
L. 324 (1998) 
35 Sujit Choudhry, op. cit., pp. 825-826. 
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In addition, David Fontana36 introduces the idea of ‘refined 
comparativism,’ a type of rulebook about when American courts 
adjudicating constitutional cases should use comparative constitutional 
law and how they should structure the process of legal borrowing 
within the context of a trial or an appeal. He gives explanation that: 
A judge should consider using comparative constitutional 
law when the American sources do not provide a clear 
answer to a question the judge must answer (whether fac-
tual or legal). The judge should use the comparative legal 
materials only if the contextual differences are relatively 
minimal –if the problems faced by importing a solution or 
fact from another country are relatively insignificant. The 
judge should then consider whether the comparative 
materials have any comparative advantages, the paradig-
matic case of when comparativism would be appropriate, 
or simply provide another “data point” (factual or legal). 
Within the framework of a trial or appeal, a judge should 
encourage litigants to argue comparative constitutional law 
to courts (when appropriate), sometimes even using expert 
witnesses on foreign law who can help the judge determine 
the relevant comparative constitutional law and its 
transferability. Judges who use comparative constitutional 
law and solicit expert witnesses to help them do so will 
encourage litigants to argue and brief foreign law, thereby 
making the judicial use of comparative constitutional law 
more accurate, because it will be based on a number of 
different sources.37 
This paper has shown above some approaches, developed by 
Tushnet, Choudry and Fontana, which can be used to justify 
comparative constitutional interpretation and also to minimise the 
negative effect of using this kind of interpretation. All lead to the 
suggestion that the danger of constitutional borrowing could be 
managed and/or prevented.  
It is time to move to the last argument. Concerning the four walls 
argument used in Singapore (and Malaysia), the paper could not agree 
more when Thio Li-ann argues that comparative constitutional 
interpretation is not rejected because it does not comply with 
                                                 
36 David Fontana, ‘Refined Comparativism in Constitutional Law’, 49 UCLA L. Rev. 
539 (2001). 
37 Ibid., pp. 556-557. 
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Singaporean local culture or ‘the four walls’, but because it does not 
support the judge’s opinion. In fact, foreign cases are cited where they 
support judicial conclusions.38  
Both pieces of evidence come from the court in Colin Chan. It 
rejected considering several US Supreme Court cases on religious 
liberty and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as has been 
mentioned earlier, but, at the same time, approvingly cited the 
Australian High Court case of Adelaide Company of Jehovah’s Witnesses v. 
Commonwealth of Australia (67 CLR 116 (1943)) where legislation 
outlawing organisations which opposed the war effort was challenged 
as being unconstitutional.  
This meant that the Adelaide Company of Jehovah’s Witnesses 
was outlawed and the government seized their premises. The court 
unanimously held that Parliament could make laws which barred the 
advocacy of doctrines which prejudiced the prosecution of a war in 
which the government was engaged. The constitutional guarantee of 
religious freedom is effectively curtailed. 39 
The paper has discussed whether a constitution can be interpreted 
beyond its ‘four walls’. Having discussed the issue, analysed both sides 
of arguments and considered materials from the USA, Canada, South 
Africa, Malaysia, Hungary and Singapore, the paper takes the position 
that a constitution can be interpreted comparatively and beyond the 
‘four walls.’ It is hoped that analysing other constitutions would 
contribute to the understanding of our own constitution.  
In Patrick Glenn’s work, comparative law goes beyond the legal 
problem-based approach. Glenn goes further by looking at legal 
traditions. Glenn takes the view that all traditions contain elements of 
the others. Western legal traditions may contain some of the Eastern 
legal traditions. “There are always common elements and common 
subjects of discussion.”40 Therefore, Glenn rejects the claim that a 
                                                 
38 Thio Li-ann, ‘An ‘i’ for an ‘I’? Singapore’s Communitarian Model of Constitutional 
Adjudication,’ 27 Hong Kong L.J. 152 (1997). 
39 Thio Li-ann criticises this ‘constitutional borrowing’ on the grounds that the case 
“…was decided while Australia was engaged in World War Two and for this case to be 
cited approvingly in a Singapore court during peace-time is evidence of an 
identification with a ‘siege mentality’ which is understandable where the exigencies of 
war require the curtailment of individual liberties. But Singapore is not at war.” Thio 
Li-ann, op. cit., pp. 176-177. 
40 H. Patrick Glenn, Legal Traditions of the World (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2000), p. 35. 
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religious legal tradition is incompatible or incommensurable with a 
secular legal tradition. However, at the same time, Glenn does not 
suggest that in all traditions all is subject to negotiation. He concludes 
that traditions may absorb foreign elements and contain them, as they 
contain many internal elements of variance or dissidence. Tradition 
should be defined as information and information is not dominating.  
According to Glenn, comparative legal tradition is also beyond 
technical things. One does not need to be free from the context of 
each system. One can compare different versions of law with criteria 
drawn from themselves, with internal criteria. There is no tertio 
comparationis; it is all internal debate, which is what gives it its sense. 
Glenn rejects the proposition that ‘you can’t have your cake and eat it 
too’.41 He offers multivalent views that everything would be a matter 
of degree. It is possible to compare apples and oranges. In other 
words, according to Glenn, “you can have your cake and eat it too, if 
you eat only half of it.”42 Moreover, comparative reasoning allows and 
facilitates judgment. “Not only is contextual judgment possible, the 
judgment based on criteria of existing traditions, juxtaposed with other 
criteria, is the only judgment which can possibly exist.”43  
Borrowing from Indonesia  
As I take the position that a country can learn and even borrow the 
constitutional provisions, interpretations and decisions from the other 
countries, I outline eight points from the 1999-2002 constitutional 
reform taken place in Indonesia that can be “borrowed” by the Muslim 
world. In other words, Indonesia could be seen as providing a model 
for other countries in the Muslim world in reconciling Shari>‘ah and 
democratic constitutionalism.44  
Firstly, not a single Islamic political party proposed the idea of the 
khilafah as the form for Indonesian governance. The very fact that 
Indonesia is the largest Muslim country in the world does not lead 
them even to propose that Indonesia become an Islamic state, like 
Egypt, Iran or Saudi Arabia. According to the Amendments, Indonesia 
                                                 
41Ibid, p. 325. 
42 H. Patrick Glenn, ‘The Capture, Reconstruction and Marginalization of “Custom”’ 
(1997) 45 American Journal of Comparative Law 613. 
43 Ibid, p. 44.  
44 The eight points I outline here are based on my forthcoming book: Nadirsyah 
Hosen, Sharia and Constitutional Reform in Indonesia (Singapore: ISEAS, 2007). 
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remains a republic, with a presidential system and three branches of 
government.  
Secondly, Islamic political parties have accepted that sovereignty 
belongs to the people. Without necessarily ignoring the role of God, 
the `Ummah (the totality of the Muslim population of the state) 
becomes the collective agent of the Divine Sovereign, rather than an 
individual person (Caliph). As a consequence of rejecting the caliphate 
form, the Indonesian people (including all Islamic political parties) 
adopted popular sovereignty. In fact, the issue of sovereignty was 
never raised during constitutional debate at the MPR Session (1999-
2002). It has been accepted without any controversy. It is safe to argue 
that Indonesian Muslims have modified the views of the formal 
Shari >‘ah, as in the cases of the form of government, sovereignty, and 
pre-conditions for becoming the head of state.45  
Thirdly, no single word in the Amendments provides special rights 
for Muslims to become President or Vice-President. Therefore, it 
would be constitutional if a non-Muslim were elected to the top 
position in Indonesia. The Constitution does not forbid a woman 
becoming President. Whilst there is no limitation on the Caliph’s 
period in office, the Indonesian Constitution limits the term to two 5-
year terms for both President and Vice-President. The Amendements 
also adopt direct election for the Presidency, whilst the exercise of the 
flexibility of the syƒr ~ and bay`ah makes them compatible with any of 
the electoral systems. Moreover, the Amendment regulates the 
procedure to impeach the President. The adoption of this new 
provision is a clear departure from the formal Shari >‘ah tradition.  
                                                 
45 The idea of substantive and formal approach of Syar‚`ah that I used in this paper is 
inspired by Peter Beyer’s work. Beyer has examined the terms ‘religious function’ and 
‘religious performance’. According to Beyer, religious function refers to “pure” religious 
action: the cure for souls, the search for enlightenment or salvation and so on. 
Religious performance is the strategy that uses religion to solve problems that are for 
example social, political or economical and not religious in the sense of “personal 
piety”. According to Beyer there are two versions of religious performance, one 
“liberal” and one “conservative”. Representatives for the “liberal” one are advocates 
of ecumenism, inclusivism and tolerance towards plurality regarding religious function, 
respecting the individual choice. They also view religion as a moral or ethical guideline 
able to solve social problems. Advocates for the “conservative” version accentuate the 
need of putting holism above pluralism and exclusion above inclusion. They stress the 
authority of one specific religious tradition over all other spheres of society. They also 
demand that religious norm should be enforced by law. See. Peter Beyer, Religion and 
Globalization (London: Sage Publication Ltd, 1994), pp. 70-71, 79-93. 
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As has been demonstrated, these cases justify the notion that the 
Indonesian people are not only willing to accept the substantive 
Shari >‘ah approach, but also to value the rule of law. More importantly, 
the Amendments have filled the gap left by the formal Shari >‘ah, as in 
the cases of presidential tenure, method of elections, and method of 
dethroning the head of state, by providing new regulations. 
Fourthly, since popular sovereignty is adopted into the 1945 
Constitution (and is accepted by all Islamic political parties), the 
legislative functions of the Indonesian parliament are asserted, along 
with other functions: budgetary and supervisory functions. These are 
to ensure that the checks and balances systems work. Once again, the 
Indonesian Constitution fills the void left by Islamic history, owing to 
the fact that ahl al-h}a>l wa al-‘aqd had only one main function: to elect 
the Caliph. The substantive Shari >‘ah approach taken by Indonesia 
encourages the extension of the functions and power of ahl al-h}a>l wa al-
‘aqd.  
Fifthly, in order to fulfil one of the requirements of Negara Hukum, 
the Indonesian Constitution establishes judicial independence. 
Although Islamic history reveals many different stories on whether or 
not caliphs respected and valued the judicial independence. It follows 
from the Amendments that all Islamic political parties in Indonesia 
take the position that judicial independence is a tool for establishing 
constitutional government, and there is no provision in the Qur’a >n 
which responds negatively to the independence of the judiciary. 
Following the resignation of President Soeharto, the establishment 
of a Negara Hukum, through the Amendments to the 1945 
Constitution, becomes significant. The 32 years of the Soeharto 
government proved that, without the rule of law, constitutional 
government will become an item on a wish list. The contributions of 
Islamic political parties to the process of the Amendments, by 
adopting a substantive Shari >‘ah approach, should be seen as their ijtiha>d. 
Not only does this suggest that the rule of law is compatible with the 
Shari >‘ah, it also reflects the ability to deal with a modern constitution 
without abandoning the principles and the objectives of Shari >‘ah. 
Sixthly, whilst the tendency of other human rights documents in 
Islam, ranging from the Constitutions of Iran, Egypt and Basic Laws 
of Saudi Arabia to UIDHR and the Cairo Declaration, is to restrict 
human rights provision under the rules of the Shari >‘ah, such restriction 
does not exist in the Second Amendment to the 1945 Constitution. In 
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other words, Shari >‘ah is neither above nor outside the human rights 
provision in the 1945 Constitution. The principles of Shari >‘ah inspire 
human rights protection since they can walk together side by side. 
All Islamic political parties in Indonesia refer to the situation in 
Soeharto era particularly when many Muslim activists were sent to jail 
without human rights protection. Therefore, it is in the interests of 
Islamic political parties to ensure that such abuse would not occur in 
the post-Soeharto era. This explains why they have given full support 
to the inclusion of human rights provisions in the Amendment to the 
1945 Constitution. 46 
All Islamic political parties take the position that human rights are 
compatible with the substantive Shari >‘ah approach. To put it 
differently, they operate on the premise that Islam is in substance 
compatible with Western human rights legal norms if interpreted 
accordingly. To support this contention they refer, on the general level, 
to the elasticity of Islam and to its capability to accommodate various 
interpretations equally favourable or hostile to human rights. 47 
The acceptance of human rights provisions without any restriction 
to the formal understanding of the Shari >‘ah suggests that the 
Indonesian Islamic political parties which were involved in the process 
of constitutional reform during 1999-2002 differ in their position from 
other Muslim groups who openly reject the concept of human rights as 
based on alien Western notions or as a conspiracy against Islam and 
from those who take pains to establish a specifically Islamic human 
rights scheme within an ideological framework devoid of a legal reform 
in Islam. 
Seventhly, although the Second Amendment to the 1945 
Constitution accepts human rights in their full substance, this does not 
mean that religions do not have a role at all in Indonesia. Religious 
values along with justice, morality, security, public order, and 
democracy, should be taken into account in implementing human 
rights provisions of the 1945 Constitution. It is worth noting that the 
phrase ‘religious values’ does not refer only to Islam but to other 
religions as well. Moreover, the word ‘values’ connotes spiritual or 
                                                 
46 Nadirsyah Hosen, ‘Human Rights Provisions in the Second Amendment to the 
Indonesian Constitution from Shari>‘ah Perspective’, The Muslim World, Vol. 97, No. 2., 
April 2007. 
47 Ibid.  
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ethical norms rather than law or regulation. In the context of Islam, 
religious values can be interpreted as Shari >‘ah in its original meaning as 
a ‘path’ or guide, rather than a detailed legal code.  
Mashood A. Baderin shares a similar observation “The scope of 
international human rights can be positively enhanced in the Muslim 
world through moderate, dynamic, and constructive interpretations of 
the Shari >‘ah rather than through hardline and static interpretations of 
it.” 48 
The full acceptance of human rights provisions has shown that 
Indonesia has provided a model for other Islamic countries to 
acknowledge the compatibility of human rights and Islamic law. This 
position is closely related to the role of public religion in Indonesia, 
which differs from the position of Iran, Egypt and Saudi Arabia.49 
Egypt is an interesting model of how the country put Shari >‘ah 
provisions in the constitution through amendment of the cons-
titution.50 In 1980 Egypt has amended Article 2 of the Constitution 
which states, “The principles of the Islamic Shari >‘ah are the principal 
source of legislation”. Saudi Arabia could be seen as a model of a state 
which believes that Shari >‘ah is above the constitution.51 Another 
differential fact is that a majority of Egyptians follow the Hanafi and 
Syafi’i schools, whereas Saudi Arabia follows the Hanbali school. n 1 
March 1992, King Fahd ibn ‘Abd al-‘Aziz issued three major laws: the 
Basic Law of Government, the Consultative Council Law and the Law 
of Provinces. The first formalises several aspects of the constitutional 
framework of the country; the second replaces the existing council, 
established in 1926, with a new council to be appointed by the king; 
and the third aims at regulating the relationship between central 
government agencies and regional governors, replacing a 1963 law. 
These laws constitute significant steps toward codifying the largely 
                                                 
48 Mashood A. Baderin, International Human Rights and Islamic Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003), p. 219. 
49 Nadirsyah Hosen, ‘Constitutionalism and Shari'a’. Murdoch University Electronic Journal 
of Law, 11 (1), (2004). 
50 See, for example, Kevin Boyle and Adel Omar Sherif (eds.), Human Rights and 
Democracy: the Role of the Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt (London: Kluwer Law 
International, 1996). 
51 More information on Saudi Arabia can be found in Frank Edward Vogel, ‘Islamic 
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unwritten legal system of the country.52 In addition, the Constitution 
of Iran should also be considered. Iran is a republic and it follows the 
Syi`ah school of thought.53 The foundation for Islamic Republic of 
Iran is based on a new Constitution (after the Islamic revolution) 
which was established in 1979 and was amended in 1989. According to 
Article 4 of the Constitution, all laws and regulations in civil, criminal, 
political and other aspects shall be based on Islamic principles. The 
Iranian Constitution is based on the concept of Wila>ya>t al-Fiqh 
(governance of the Islamic jurist introduced and coined by Ayatullah 
Khumayni).54 In this context, the paper suggests that Iran, Egypt and 
Saudi Arabia should borrow from the Indonesian constitutional 
reform. 
Eighthly, In Indonesia, the Pancasila (the five pillars that eventually 
became the state foundation: Belief in one God, Humanitarianism, 
National Unity, Representative Democracy, and Social Justice) in this 
regard basically compromises between secularism, where no single 
religion predominates in the state, and religiosity, where religion 
(especially Islam) became one of the important pillars of the state. An 
Islam-inspired agenda is welcome, to the extent that it corresponds 
with, and does not contradict, the Pancasila. In other words, it is a 
common belief that Indonesia is neither a secular nor an Islamic state. 
Both of the terms have negative images in Indonesian society, and 
therefore the use of the terms ‘secular’ and ‘Islamic state’ has been 
avoided in legal and political areas. Under the 1945 Constitution, 
Indonesia has been designed to stand in the middle position. The 
Pancasila-based state, which begins with the principle of ‘One 
Godhead’, not only allows, but also encourages, religion to inspire 
Indonesian public life in humanitarianism, national unity, 
representative democracy, and social justice.55 
                                                 
52 See James T. McHugh, Comparative Constitutional Traditions (New York: Peter Lang, 
2002), pp. 193-211. 
53 More information can be found in Asghar Schirazi, The Constitution of Iran: Politics and 
the State in the Islamic Republic (London: I. B. Tauris, 1997). 
54 See Abdulaziz Abdulhussein Sachedina, The Just Ruler (al-Sultan al-Adil) in Shiite Islam: 
the Comprehensive Authority of the Jurist in Imamite Jurisprudence (New York: Oxford 
University Press , 1988). 
55 Nadirsyah Hosen, ‘Religion and the Indonesian Constitution: A Recent Debate’, 
Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 36(3): pp. 419-440, 2005. 
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Conclusion 
It is worth considering that the outcome of the 1999-2002 
constitutional reform serves as the common denominator (kali >mah al-
sawa>’) for the Indonesian people to support human rights, the rule of 
law and religious liberty. However, Gary Bell has correctly pointed out 
that “constitutions do not perform miracles”.56 This suggests that it 
would be misleading to assume that the Amendments to the 1945 
Constitution would automatically bring Indonesian people out of 
economic, political and legal crisis. In other words, the first challenge 
faced by Indonesian people is to ensure that the Amendments will not 
turn out to have little more value than the wallpaper on the houses of 
the politicians and generals who have ignored them. 
The recent 2004 elections in Indonesia is illustrative. Indonesian 
people have exercised their constitutional rights to rotate elites, to 
select leaders, to express grievances and desires, in free and fair 
elections. In the context of Muslim world, certainly, this rare expe-
rience is a significant way to show that the compatibility of Shari >‘ah and 
constitutionalism does not lead to a political chaos or to inflict harm 
(mafsadah) upon society. Instead, it protects public interest—as the 
main objective of Shari >‘ah. [] 
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